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[The following article is reprinted with the permission of Latinamerica Press in Lima, Peru. It first
appeared in the Jan. 31, 1997 edition of the weekly publication Latinamerica Press.]
Congressman Javier Diez Canseco, one of two Izquierda Unida (IU) members in Peru's 120-member
Congress, was one of the first hostages released by Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)
rebels who have been holding 72 hostages in the Japanese ambassador's mansion since Dec. 17.
Since his release, Diez Canseco has been working nonstop to ensure a peaceful solution to the crisis.
Latinamerica Press writer Cecilia Remon talked with the congressman about his experience and
possible solutions to the crisis.
LP: How do you evaluate the crisis thus far? Javier Diez Canseco: It is very clear that [President
Alberto] Fujimori has suffered a major setback. Fujimori's support was based on two factors:
controlling hyperinflation and attacking subversion, particularly that coming from Sendero
Luminoso and the MRTA. In 1992, the leaders of both groups were captured and their actions
diminished significantly. From one day to the next, Peruvians discovered that a military solution
to the violence only reduced the problem but did not solve it. A political solution is lacking. They
discovered that the pacification process is very fragile. The Catholic Church, for example, has been
clear in starting to talk about justice and peace, to link the problem of peace with the serious social
problems in the country. They are preaching peace, but also solidarity and justice to confront the
problem of violence.
LP: Who in the government is managing the crisis?
Diez Canseco: I have no doubt that it is being managed by Fujimori and his military advisors.
Fujimori is running things with Vladimiro Montesinos, who is the shadowy head of the National
Intelligence Service (Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional, SIN). The MRTA sent out a few signs (before
the siege) that it was planning an important action. I am certain that the intelligence services and the
police were much more irresponsible than has been reported thus far. The political price of the crisis
is a serious problem for this government. This is one reason why I fear that there might be a military
solution, because if the bullets begin to fly, if there is blood and death, the military will say that there
was no other way out, and the militarization of the country will not only continue, but get worse.
They may want to cover up their irresponsibility and failure with blood, and this concerns me.
LP: Who else opposes a peaceful solution?
Diez Canseco: It's not only the military sectors within the government who want to block a peaceful
agreement. The bloodiest faction of Sendero Luminoso, which is led by "Feliciano" and kills civilians
in the most brutal ways, has shown that it is just as genocidal as ever. There is no possibility of
dialogue with them.
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LP: What are some of the arguments to reject a hard-line solution?
Diez Canseco: It is ridiculous to say that there is no room for a negotiated solution simply because
the MRTA is a small group. First, it is absurd to think that the MRTA is made up only of the rebels
inside the Japanese ambassador's residence. The logistics needed to carry out an attack of this
proportion require at least five times the number of rebels inside the residence. Second, the
calmness and level of training demonstrated by the rebels holding the residence reflect the group's
experience as an armed movement in the central jungle region. Third, if they are able to pull off
politically destabilizing actions, it is ridiculous to reject dialogue in favor of the barrel of a gun.
Fourth, regardless of whether the MRTA survives, the conditions of violence in Peru because of
poverty and frustration will continue. If we do not deal with the causes of the violence and if we
do not find the mechanisms to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor...we are not going
to advance. Although this is not the correct term, at times I feel that we are living with an autistic
government, which is incapable of dialogue or negotiating.
LP: Do you see anything positive coming from the siege?
Diez Canseco: Although the situation is complicated and it needs to be evaluated very carefully, I
think in Peru new spaces are being created in which businesspeople, intellectuals, and politicians
are looking at the problem of peace as a political problem and saying that national reconciliation
must be part of an integral national plan. I believe that what has happened can have a positive
ending, despite the terrible situation that has been created and the fact that the MRTA's actions
openly violate the Geneva Conventions. Through dialogue Peru can begin a process that can be
positive for all sectors. Peruvians have discovered that a military solution is not sufficient, that is
does not resolve political problems and a culture of violence and intolerance. A culture of tolerance
has to be tied to a culture of justice and solidarity. We need to understand that people who live
waiting for crumbs to fall from the plates of the rich will not have hope in the future.
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